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Hydraulic Fracturing and “Spotty” Regulation: Why 
the Federal Government Should Let States Control 
Unconventional Onshore Drilling  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed a shift of focus in the oil and gas 
industry. Conventional sources of energy are drying up.1 Global 
demand is on the rise.2 And offshore drilling, though potentially 
extremely lucrative, has proven to be a risky endeavor.3 As many 
experts see it, solutions for developers must now come in the form of 
unconventional onshore extraction techniques, which allow 
operators to tap reserves previously thought uneconomical or even 
impossible to produce.4 While developers have traditionally focused 
on cheap, vertical wells and shallow pools of oil and gas, future 
economic success will likely require expensive directional drilling and 
unconventional sources of energy.5 
 
 1. See, e.g., ENERGY PORTFOLIOS 81 (U. Aswathanarayana & Rao S. Divi eds., 2009) 
(“The world’s production of conventional hydrocarbons will soon decline.”). 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 82 (“[W]orld energy consumption is projected . . . to expand by 50 
percent from 2005 to 2030.”). 
 3. The 2010 catastrophe involving BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig is, of course, the classic 
example. As stated by a national commission formed in response to the incident:  
The BP Deepwater Horizon disaster undermined public faith in the oil and gas 
industry, in government regulators, and even in America’s ability to respond to 
crises. . . . The development of offshore energy resources contributes substantially to 
local economies, supporting business small and large and employing tens of 
thousands of workers. But any sensible energy policy must recognize the substantial 
risks that accompany these real benefits . . . .  
NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF 
OFFSHORE DRILLING 293–95 (2011) [hereinafter BP COMM’N]. 
 4. See, e.g., ROBERT L. EVANS, FUELING OUR FUTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 65 (2007) (“There is a need . . . to develop new or ‘non-conventional’ 
sources of fossil fuels to supplement the traditional crude oil supplies. . . . In the near-term 
these ‘new’ sources . . . include the unlocking of ‘synthetic oil’ from the extensive oil sands and 
oil shale deposits found in many parts of the world, and the extraction of natural gas from 
unused coal seams, known as ‘coal-bed methane.’”).  
 5. See, e.g., AARON M. AZELTON & ANDREW S. TEUFEL, FISHER INVESTMENTS ON 
ENERGY 7–8 (2009) (“[M]any believe the largest, most easily accessible conventional oil and 
gas deposits in the world are already tapped. As a result, companies must search for oil and gas 
in increasingly harsh environments like deep offshore or rugged, remote terrains. The 
advancement of technology has enabled firms to tap into increasingly remote areas and at 
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The Barnett Shale play in Texas offers an illustrative example. 
One of the largest natural gas discoveries in the world, the field sits 
directly below the city of Fort Worth, Texas, where gas extraction is 
only possible at a price of $2–3 million per well.6 Even then, drilling 
would not be economical without the use of hydraulic fracturing7 
(often referred to as “fracking” or “hydrofracking”), a technique 
used to break up source rock by injecting large amounts of water and 
other substances into a well at such high pressures that the rock 
cracks, or fractures.8 The injected fluid usually contains a propping 
agent (normally sand or artificial ceramic beads), which “props 
open” the fracture and allows oil and gas to flow to the wellhead.9 
Hydrofracking in the Barnett Shale is often combined with 
horizontal drilling, a technique that extends a well’s reach and allows 
operators to produce gas in urban areas where population concerns 
complicate the drilling process.10 These methods are also employed 
in rural regions. In the Williston Basin of western North Dakota and 
eastern Montana, for example, fracking and horizontal drilling 
enable developers to target tight shale plays where oil could not be 
efficiently produced only a decade or two ago.11 In fact, such well-
stimulation techniques have become so efficient and so lucrative for 
 
greater depths. Moreover, technology and high oil and gas prices may also make it 
economically viable to tap unconventional hydrocarbons, which were previously too expensive 
to recover profitably.”). 
 6. Billie Ann Maxwell, Note, Texas Tug of War: A Survey of Urban Drilling and the 
Issues an Operator Will Face, 4 TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 337, 338, 341 (2009). 
 7. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2008) 
(“[T]he Barnett Shale in north Texas . . . is entirely dependent on hydraulic fracturing.”). 
 8. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND 
SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FACTURING OF COALBED METHANE 
RESERVOIRS STUDY app. A-1 (U.S. Dep’t of Energy: Hydraulic Fracturing White Paper) 
(2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/ 
cbmstudy_attach_uic_append_a_doe_whitepaper.pdf. 
 9. Id. 
 10.  See, e.g., Lisa Vaughn, New Facets of Old Alternatives for Unleased Mineral Interests, 
16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.  113, 114 (2009) (“[A] horizontal well’s bore site [can] be placed 
far from where the reservoir will actually be tapped, thus allowing operators to comply with 
municipal regulations and public policy issues by placing drilling activities further from 
homes.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Clifford Krauss, Drilling Boom Revives Hopes for Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 25, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/25/ 
business/25gas.htm (explaining that much of the shale in the U.S. “has been known for more 
than a century to contain gas, but it was considered virtually worthless until a decade ago” 
because companies lacked the technologies, like fracking, needed to extract the gas 
economically). 
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oil producers in the U.S. that most of the country’s oil and gas 
billionaires have made their fortunes investing in onshore, not 
offshore, drilling.12 
At the same time, few onshore operations pose more concerns 
than hydraulic fracturing. The debate regarding its potential negative 
environmental effects has morphed into an outright firestorm in 
recent years, with drilling advocates staunchly defending the 
practice13 but facing fierce opposition from environmental groups 
and even politicians.14 New York Attorney General Eric 
Schneiderman, for example, has promised to sue to keep 
hydrofracking out of his state until more information is available 
regarding its environmental effects.15 
 
 12. Christopher Helman, America’s Richest Oilmen, FORBES.COM (June 17, 2010, 1:00 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/17/koch-hamm-bass-kaiser-business-energy-oil-
billionaires.html.  
 13. See, e.g., INDEP. PETROL. ASS’N OF AM., HYDRAULIC FRACTURING: EFFECTS ON 
ENERGY SUPPLY, THE ECONOMY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 2 (2008), available at 
http://www.energyindepth.org/PDF/Hydraulic-Fracturing-3-E%27s.pdf (“[H]ydraulic 
fracturing has never presented an environmental risk.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Jennifer Goldman, Hydraulic Fracturing Myths and Facts, OIL & GAS 
ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT/EARTHWORKS 1 (April 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/FS_hydraulic-fracturing_myths-factsFINAL.pdf 
(“Hydraulic fracturing fluids contain toxic chemicals and are being injected into and near 
drinking water supplies.”). 
 15. Jon Campbell, Attorney General-Elect Schneiderman Staunchly Opposes Hydraulic 
Fracturing, STARGAZETTE.COM (Nov. 7, 2010, 3:55 PM), http://www.stargazette.com/ 
article/20101107/NEWS01/11070359/1113/Attorney-General-elect-Schneiderman-
staunchly-opposes-hydraulic-fracturing. The fracking controversy inspired David Pursell, a 
research analyst at an energy investment bank, to pen the following lines, borrowing from a 
famous scene in A Few Good Men: 
You want the truth? You can’t handle the truth! We live in a world that needs clean 
natural gas, and gas wells have to be frac’d by men with rigs and pumps. Who’s 
gonna do it? Microsoft? Apple? The energy industry has greater responsibility than 
you could possibly fathom. You weep for your i-phone app, and you curse the frac 
crews. You have that luxury. You have the luxury of not knowing what we know. 
That fossil energy fuels economic growth. And the existence of frac’ing, while 
grotesque and incomprehensible to you, powers our economy. You don’t want the 
truth because deep down in places you don’t talk about on Facebook, you want 
them on that frac, you need them on that frac. We use words like pressure, 
proppant, conductivity. We use these words as the backbone of a life spent 
producing gas. You use them as a punchline. We have neither the time nor the 
inclination to explain ourselves to someone who takes a hot shower every morning 
using the natural gas that we provide, and then questions the manner in which we 
provide it. We would rather you just said thank you, and went on your way. 
Otherwise, we suggest you pick up a pipe wrench, and meet us on location. We have 
wells to frac! 
John McFarland, More on the Frac’ing Controversy, OIL AND GAS LAWYER BLOG (Oct. 1, 
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Although hydraulic fracturing has been widely employed by the 
energy industry for more than sixty years, the last decade has 
witnessed an intense push for more government regulation, 
especially from the federal level.16 This Comment will discuss the 
various legal issues implicated by this enormously lucrative practice, 
as well as evaluate the desirability of additional federal controls. 
Ultimately, this Comment argues that regulatory decisions in this 
realm are best left to the states. While environmental concerns over 
hydrofracking should not be ignored, in many cases they have been 
overstated. More importantly, the characteristics of reserves (and 
therefore specific hydraulic fracturing techniques) vary from state to 
state, making the success of any regulatory system highly dependent 
on regulators’ knowledge of local and regional industry realities. 
Each of the nation’s major oil- and gas-producing states have 
effectively grappled with both the environmental and legal challenges 
posed by the practice since its inception more than half a century 
ago, and they have done so in a way that has not only generally 
protected public health but also encouraged economic growth and 
preserved state common law theories regarding oil and gas 
development and tort liability. At this late stage, adding an extra 
layer of federal control will not only fail to diminish fracking’s 
environmental effects but will also create unnecessary inefficiencies 
that could cripple operators’ ability to meet domestic energy 
demand. 
This Comment begins, in Part II, with a background section 
discussing the history and regulation of hydraulic fracturing and 
highlighting the predominantly positive effects the practice has had 
on the economics of the oil and gas industry. Part III then analyzes 
both the legal problems and the environmental concerns created by 
fracking, outlining how various states have addressed them and 
 
2010, 3:50 PM), http://www.oilandgaslawyerblog.com/2010/10/more-on-the-fracing-
controvers.html. 
 16. See Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil and 
Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115, 182–
87 (2009) (arguing that the federal government should complete a comprehensive study of 
fracking’s effects and consider regulating it under the Safe Drinking Water Act); Angela C. 
Cupas, Note, The Not-So-Safe Drinking Water Act: Why We Must Regulate Hydraulic 
Fracturing at the Federal Level, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 605 (2009). 
Professor Wiseman’s article is by far the most comprehensive review of hydraulic fracturing 
published by a legal scholar in recent years. This Comment is intended, at least in part, to offer 
counterarguments to several of her main points. 
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discussing the recent push for additional federal controls. Part IV 
argues that hydrofracking solutions should be enacted at the state 
and local levels, avoiding the costs and conflicts created by federal 
regulation of issues traditionally left to the domain of state and local 
governments.  Finally, Part V concludes. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Brief History of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Economic Effects 
The first hydraulic fracturing job was completed in 1947 on the 
Klepper No. 1 well in western Kansas.17 At the time, fracking fluid 
consisted of “a gasoline-based napalm gel,”18 which obviously made 
the fracturing process hazardous for rig workers.19 The Klepper 
operators’ goal was to compare fracking with acidizing,20 a technique 
that involves injecting either hydrofluoric or hydrochloric acid 
(depending on the type of source rock) into the well to eat away 
production-impeding material.21 As it turned out, acidizing was 
more effective on the Klepper,22 but fracking eventually developed 
into “a standard treatment” for well stimulation in the U.S.23 Since 
the Klepper No. 1 was drilled, U.S. developers have completed 
almost a million frack jobs.24 
Today, fracking companies work in every major oil- and gas-
producing state, often stimulating wells near metropolitan areas and 
in densely-populated states where oil and gas extraction has a more 
limited history.25 And just as drilling challenges vary by location, so 
 
 17. CARBONATE RESERVOIR CHARACTERIZATION: A GEOLOGIC – ENGINEERING 
ANALYSIS, PART II 296–97 (George V. Chilingarian et al. eds., 1996) [hereinafter 
ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]. 
 18. Id. at 296. 
 19. EVAN K. NYER ET AL., IN SITU TREATMENT TECHNOLOGY 444 (2d ed. 2001). 
 20. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, supra note 17, at 297. 
 21. Oil Well Stimulation, OILPRIMER.COM (2008), http://www.oilprimer.com/oil-
well-stimulation.html (last visited February 21, 2011). 
 22. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS, supra note 17, at 297. 
 23. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 8, at A-1. 
 24. MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34201, SAFE DRINKING WATER ACT 
(SDWA): SELECTED REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE ISSUES 22 (2010). 
 25. Id. Gas discoveries in formations like the Marcellus Shale (located in parts of New 
York, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania), for example, have spurred increased hydraulic 
fracturing in eastern states. As Tiemann explains, with the increase in drilling come “new 
concerns about possible gas development threats to underground sources of drinking water.” 
Id. 
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too do fracking methods. In many places, companies routinely 
perform multistage fracks along horizontal26 wellbores.27 This 
technique has been especially popular in Texas’s prolific Barnett 
Shale,28 as well as in the Bakken Shale of North Dakota and 
Montana, where experts estimate nearly four billion barrels of oil 
could still be recovered.29 
As fracking technologies have improved, fracking’s popularity—
and its importance to the energy industry—has seen extraordinary 
growth. As Professor Wiseman describes: 
In 2000, the Railroad Commission of Texas issued 273 permits for 
drilling in the Barnett Shale. In 2004 it issued 1,112 permits, and 
by 2007 the number . . . had skyrocketed to 3,653. In Montana, 
every oil well in the Bakken Shale formation is frac[k]ed, with more 
than 600 wells drilled to-date, while local newspapers report that 
operators in New York’s Marcellus Shale may drill and frac[k] more 
than 1,500 wells annually.30 
Of course, the growth in drilling has turned hydraulic fracturing 
into big business. The Independent Petroleum Association of 
America estimates that 90% of all U.S. wells undergo some form of 
fracturing, which accounts for 30% of the country’s recoverable 
 
 26. Horizontal drilling is the process of drilling vertically to a target formation and then 
turning the wellbore horizontally along the formation to complete the well. This is essentially 
the definition adopted by the Department of Energy:  
Horizontal drilling is the process of drilling and completing, for production, a well 
that begins as a vertical or inclined linear bore which extends from the surface to a 
subsurface location just above the target oil or gas reservoir called the “kickoff 
point,” then bears off on an arc to intersect the reservoir at the “entry point,” and, 
thereafter, continues at a near-horizontal attitude tangent to the arc, to substantially 
or entirely remain within the reservoir until the desired bottom hole location is 
reached. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DRILLING SIDEWAYS – A REVIEW OF 
HORIZONTAL WELL TECHNOLOGY AND ITS DOMESTIC APPLICATION 1 (1993), available at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/pub/oil_gas/natural_gas/analysis_publications/drilling_sideways_w
ell_technology/pdf/tr0565.pdf.  
 27. See Rocky Seale, Open-Hole Completion System Enables Multi-Stage Fracturing and 
Stimulation Along Horizontal Wellbores, DRILLING CONTRACTOR, July/Aug. 2007, at 112. 
 28. See Maxwell, supra note 6, at 340 (“Development of natural gas in the Barnett Shale 
requires horizontal drilling and a technique called hydraulic fracturing.”). 
 29. U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL RESOURCES IN 
THE DEVONIAN-MISSISSIPPIAN BAKKEN FORMATION, WILLISTON BASIN PROVINCE, 
MONTANA AND NORTH DAKOTA 1 (2008), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/ 
3021/pdf/FS08-3021_508.pdf. 
 30. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 123–24 (citations omitted). 
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reserves.31 Experts say that, from shales alone, developers could 
produce nearly 850 trillion cubic feet of gas, “enough to supply 
about forty years’ worth of natural gas, at today’s consumption 
rate.”32 In order to extract it, thousands of wells will have to be 
drilled33—and, of course, fracked. 
Developers’ ability to produce oil and gas from previously 
ignored formations has resulted in huge economic rewards, not only 
for well owners and operators, but also for rig workers, local 
governments, and community members. Lease bonuses from Barnett 
Shale producers, for example, have already generated over $100 
million for the city of Fort Worth, which “expects to receive more 
than $1 billion in natural gas revenues over the next 20 years.”34 A 
2009 study predicts that operations in the area will create 70,000 
jobs and add $6.5 billion annually to the Texas economy.35 School 
districts with mineral interests in the area have even begun using well 
revenues to create scholarship programs.36 
Production from other shale formations has led to similar 
economic rewards. As a 2008 New York Times article described: 
In the United States, real estate speculators are becoming overnight 
millionaires in Pennsylvania, Louisiana and Texas by buying up 
parcels of land and flipping them to companies that drill for natural 
gas. Wildcatters are ordering every rig they can get their hands on, 
and paying signing bonuses of $25,000 an acre to drill below 
houses, schools and churches. Pipeline companies are building as 
fast as they can to get the new gas to market.37 
Production from the Bakken has added so many jobs to North 
Dakota’s economy that the state now has by far the country’s lowest 
unemployment rate at 3.3 percent.38 In some cities, like Williston, 
 
 31. INDEP. PETROL. ASS’N OF AM., supra note 13. 
 32. Krauss, supra note 11. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Barnett Shale Energy Educ. Council, Facts About Barnett Shale, BSEEC.ORG 
http://www.bseec.org/stories/BarnettShale (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Krauss, supra note 11. 
 38. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment Statistics: Unemployment Rates 
for States, BLS.GOV, http://www.bls.gov/web/laus/laumstrk.htm (last modified Sept. 16, 
2011). See also Monica Davey, A State with Plenty of Jobs but Few Places to Live, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 21, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/21/us/ 
21ndakota.html (“While the rest of the country was sinking into recession, North Dakota 
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the growth happened so quickly that workers could not find 
housing—even in motels and mobile home parks.39 
All this prosperity is the result of a major change in the oil and 
gas industry. With easily accessible formations beginning to water 
out, developers are concentrating on far deeper, tighter plays where 
source rock is less permeable. This change, a necessary one if the 
United States wishes to avoid significant decreases in domestic 
production, is only possible because of hydraulic fracturing.40 
B. Minimal Federal Regulation 
Regulation of hydraulic fracturing has traditionally been left to 
states and local governments, and, until recently, federal agencies 
have shied away from including it within the scope of their control.41  
In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit issued an opinion in a suit brought 
by the Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation (LEAF), which 
argued that fracking should be regulated by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) under the Safe Drinking Water Act.42 The 
Act requires states wishing to retain control of their underground 
injection control (UIC) programs to regulate any “underground 
injection” of fluid not allowed by permit or rule.43 LEAF petitioned 
the EPA to withdraw its approval of an Alabama UIC program that 
did not regulate the injection of fracking fluids, but the EPA refused, 
determining that the definition of “underground injection” 
encompassed “only those wells whose ‘principal function’ is the 
underground placement of fluids.”44 Since the principal function of 
fracked wells is gas production, the EPA decided that regulation was 
 
never did. . . . A rise in oil production here, especially, served as an antidote to any whiff of 
what the rest of the nation was witnessing.”).  
 39. Davey, supra note 38. 
 40. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 29 (Tex. 2008) 
(Willett, J., concurring) (“We are more and more over a barrel as ‘our reserves of fossil fuels 
are becoming harder and more expensive to find.’ Given this supply-side slide, maximizing 
recovery via frac[k]ing is essential.” (quoting Bruce Write, The Texas Portfolio, FISCAL NOTES: 
SPECIAL ENERGY ISSUE, Apr. 2008, at 1, available at http://www.window.state.tx.us/ 
comptrol/fnotes/fnEnergy08/fnEnergy08.pdf)). 
 41. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 146 (“[A]side from the possibility of sporadic 
application of federal statutes, control [of hydraulic fracturing] lies in the states.”). 
 42. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 118 F.3d 1467, 
1469 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 43. Id. at 1469–70 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 145.11(a)(5) (1997); 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1) 
(1994)). 
 44. Id. at 1471. 
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not required.45 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, citing the dictionary 
definition of “injection,” meaning “the act of ‘forc[ing] (a fluid) into 
a passage, cavity, or tissue.’”46 In the court’s view, it did not matter 
that the wells were used primarily for producing gas; they “injected” 
fluids underground and so should be regulated under the statute.47 
LEAF won the suit, but the victory was short-lived. In 2005, 
Congress “conclusively withdrew frac[k]ing from the realm of federal 
regulation” by passing the Energy Policy Act, which “exempted all 
frac[k]ing with the exception of diesel fuel from the definition of 
underground injection in Section 1421 of the Safe Drinking Water 
Act.”48 
Since Congress passed the Act, fracking has remained almost 
entirely state-regulated. Calls for more federal control, however, 
appear to have hit home with some politicians. At the direction of 
Congress, EPA scientists have commenced a study of hydraulic 
fracturing’s potential effects on groundwater and drinking water.49 
The study’s purpose “is to understand the relationship between 
hydraulic fracturing and drinking water resources” and will include 
“the full lifespan of water” in the fracking process.50  
The EPA’s conclusions could prompt other federal agencies to 
take regulatory action. The Department of Energy is already in the 
process of drafting consensus advice to federal regulators on best 
practices for shale extraction,51 and Department of Interior Secretary 
Ken Salazar has indicated his Agency may adopt a chemical 
disclosure requirement for all fracking fluids used on public lands.52 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 1474. 
 47. Id. at 1475. 
 48. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 145.  
 49. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA’s Draft Hydraulic Fracturing Study Plan, 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/index.cfm (last 
visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Natural Gas Subcomm. of the Sec’y of Energy Advisory Bd., Dept. of Energy, 
Improving the Safety & Environmental Performance of Hydraulic Fracturing (Sep. 2, 2011), 
http://www.shalegas.energy.gov/index.html. 
 52. See Matthew H. Ahrens et al., Client Alert: Hydraulic Fracturing: Potential for 
Increased Federal and State Oversight, LATHAM & WATKINS ENVTL., LAND & RES. DEP’T 
(Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/pubContent/_pdf/ 
pub3832_1.pdf. 
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III. LEGAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS AND STATE 
RESPONSES  
A. Legal Issues 
Despite the financial rewards to developers, hydrofracking does 
implicate several legal issues, including questions about trespass, 
pooling, ownership, and damages.53 
1. Trespass 
Although few courts have addressed the issue in full, one widely 
debated question is whether fracking that extends across property 
lines should be considered an actionable trespass. The Texas 
Supreme Court essentially said no in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. 
Garza Energy Trust,54 the seminal case on the subject. 
In Coastal Oil, the plaintiffs, a group of mineral owners, brought 
suit against their lessee, Coastal, after it drilled and fracked a 
producing well on an adjacent property.55 The well was drilled just 
467 feet from the boundary of the owners’ tract, and they thought it 
was draining gas from under their lands.56 Coastal admitted that its 
fracking fluids and proppants probably reached beyond the boundary 
line, but the parties disagreed on whether the owners suffered any 
actual drainage.57 The Texas Supreme Court held that the owners’ 
trespass claim was barred by the rule of capture, which “gives a 
mineral rights owner title to the oil and gas produced from a lawful 
well bottomed on the property, even if the oil and gas flowed to the 
well from beneath another owner’s tract.”58 Thus, the court 
concluded, any gas that the owners supposedly lost did not actually 
belong to them.59 
The court went further than any other in actually addressing the 
fracking-trespass question, though one observer has complained that 
“[b]y using the rule of capture . . . the court avoided directly 
answering whether hydraulic fracturing resulted in a claim for 
 
 53. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 146. 
 54. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
 55. Id. at 6. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 7. 
 58. Id. at 13. 
 59. Id. 
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trespass.”60 This point is arguably moot, however, since every oil- 
and gas-producing state adheres to the rule.61 Because Texas is the 
standard-bearer on oil and gas issues, it seems likely that other courts 
facing that question will follow the Coastal Oil analysis.62 Some states 
may even go a step further. States like Louisiana and California, for 
example, follow a “non-ownership” theory of oil and gas interests.63 
In such jurisdictions, no owner holds title to any oil and gas, but 
merely a right to drill for it.64 Assuming statutory provisions have not 
altered the common law theory,65 these states seem highly unlikely to 
ever uphold a trespass claim against a fracking company.66 
2. Pooling 
Hydraulic fracturing can also raise pooling issues. Pooling refers 
to the combining of small tracts to create a single tract large enough 
to obtain a well permit.67 The purpose of pooling “is to prevent the 
physical and economic waste that accompanies the drilling of 
unnecessary wells.”68 A leading opinion that addresses pooling issues 
related to fracked wells is Hegarty v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, a 
complicated case involving the proper allocation of production from 
 
 60. Maxwell, supra note 6, at 355. 
 61. Patrick H. Martin, Campanile Professor of Mineral Law, Law Ctr., La. State Univ., 
Presentation at University of Texas School of Law, First Oil, Gas and Mineral Law “Boot 
Camp,” The Rule of Capture, Correlative Rights, and Principles of Conservation 1 (March 26, 
2009), available at http://www.utcle.org/eLibrary/preview.php?asset_file_id=20109 (partial 
version). 
 62. See Maxwell, supra note 6, at 362 (“Ultimately, other states and operators will likely 
look to Texas for guidance . . . as Texas has always been at the forefront of oil and gas law.”). 
 63. Martin, supra note 61, at 1. 
 64. John G. Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 1009 
(2008). Sprankling compares this right to that of a fisherman. The fisherman may have a 
license to fish but does not acquire title to any particular fish until reeling it in. Id. 
 65. See id. at 1010 (“Today these common law rules are increasingly modified by 
statutes that promote governmental intervention in oil and gas production at the expense of 
traditional property rights.”). 
 66. Ironically, Texas is among the states that follow an “ownership-in-place” theory, 
which allows an owner to actually hold title to oil and gas and consider it part of the real 
property lying below the surface. Id. at 1009. The owner’s title is nonetheless held subject to 
the rule of capture, id., which helps explain the court’s ruling in Coastal Oil. Theoretically, 
ownership-in-place states would be more likely than non-ownership states to uphold trespass 
claims, although the Coastal Oil opinion shows the kind of uphill battle plaintiffs will likely face 
in any jurisdiction. 
 67. PATRICK MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW 
§ 901 (2010). 
 68. Id. 
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coalbed methane wells.69 Coalbed methane is produced by extracting 
gas through cracks in coal seams, making hydraulic fracturing an 
integral part of the drilling process.70 Hegarty is useful not simply as 
a discussion of pooling as it relates to fractured wells, but also as an 
illustration of the complications that can arise when federal and state 
oil and gas laws overlap. 
In Hegarty, a methane gas company obtained approval from the 
State of Utah to drill a well on state land.71 The well’s spacing unit72 
was to be 160 acres, 65.7% of which lay under one family’s property 
located across the boundary line of the state land.73 The company 
tried unsuccessfully to lease the family members’ mineral interests 
but never offered them a chance to participate in drilling the well.74 
The company continued to drill other wells, one of which also 
drained gas from under the family’s property.75 Before the wells were 
drilled, a federal unit had been formed which encompassed both the 
family’s and the state’s land.76 The unit allowed mineral owners to 
voluntarily pool their interests,77 giving each owner participating in 
the unit a proportionate share of production from all unit wells.78 
The family members had initially elected “not to commit their lands 
to the unit,” but when they suspected that drainage was occurring 
they petitioned the Utah Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining for 
 
 69. 57 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2002). 
 70. Id. at 1044. 
 71. Id. at 1045. 
 72. The spacing unit, or “drainage field,” is the area, allocated by regulation, from 
which a single well can be expected to drain gas. See id. at 1044. 
 73. Id. at 1045. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 1046. 
 76. Id. at 1044. Although many of the lands in the unit were privately or state-owned, 
30 U.S.C. § 226 allows for “tracts containing sufficient federal lands” to be developed as a 
federal unit. Id. at 1047. 
 77. The federal unitization and pooling statute makes participation in the unit 
completely voluntary on the part of nonfederal owners. Thus, “if a non-federal owner chooses 
not to commit his land to a federal exploratory unit, then that owner must on his own find 
other ways of protecting his correlative rights.” Id. The term “correlative rights” is defined as 
“the opportunity of each owner in a pool to produce his just and equitable share of oil and gas 
in a pool without waste.” Id. at 1048 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 40-6-2(2) (West 2010)). 
 78. Id. at 1044, 1048. The share of each owner is based on the number of acres he or 
she owns in relation to all acreage in the unit, meaning that in federal units each owner shares 
in the production from all unit wells. Id. at 1048. The Utah pooling statute, on the other 
hand, gives owners “their percentage of the drainage field of an individual well,” meaning it is 
designed to allow “for participation on an individual well basis.” Id. at 1048–49. 
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retroactive spacing and pooling orders.79 The board issued the orders 
but denied retroactivity.80 On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the board’s denial, noting that “parties in possession of the 
necessary information to act in protection of their own rights bear 
the responsibility for doing so.”81 Since the family members had 
sufficient knowledge of the two wells to seek pooling long before 
they petitioned the board, it would be unjust to grant them “the 
share of production that they failed to secure for themselves by 
timely action.”82 
As in Coastal Oil, the draining in Hegarty was partly a product of 
hydraulic fracturing,83 which makes the questions of how far onto 
the family’s land the fractures extended and exactly how much gas 
migrated across the tract’s boundary difficult to answer. Perhaps the 
more interesting aspect of the case, however, is the interplay of state 
and federal law.84 
Utah law allows for forced pooling of mineral interests, but only 
if an interested party first asks the board for a spacing order.85 The 
federal pooling statute, on the other hand, is completely voluntary.86 
In Hegarty, the company naturally saw no need to seek either 
voluntary or forced pooling because, as a unit participant, it could do 
nothing and still receive a proportionate share of the proceeds from 
all unit wells while sharing its own drilling costs with other unit 
participants.87 As the court put it, the company “had no duty to act 
contrary to its own interests by seeking another layer of 
 
 79. Id. at 1044, 1046. 
 80. Id. at 1046. 
 81. Id. at 1051–52. 
 82. Id. at 1051. 
 83. See id. at 1044. 
 84. “The interaction of federal and state law on a single oil and gas field” was a topic 
that neither the Utah Supreme Court nor any “other court in the United States” had 
previously addressed. Id. at 1047. The conflicts between federal and state law in Hegarty are 
indicative of the types of questions that additional federal regulation of hydrofracking would 
undoubtedly create as states struggle to reconcile conflicting and overlapping federal and state 
rules. 
 85. Id. at 1048. 
 86. Id. at 1047. 
 87. See id. at 1048 (“[T]he Federal Act does not formally mandate uniform spacing 
throughout the field. Therefore, participants share in production based on their percentage of 
acreage ownership of the committed lands in the whole unit, rather than their percentage of 
the drainage field of an individual well.”). 
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regulation.”88 Theoretically, if there had been no federal unit, the 
company would still not have been required to apply for spacing and 
pooling orders for its two wells, but Utah operators commonly seek 
spacing orders before drilling in order “to prevent uncommitted 
owners from riding the well down free without paying a share of 
[the] costs.”89 Thus, without the federal statute and federal unit, the 
family would probably not have missed out on initial production 
from the two wells. In this case, the presence of federal lands made 
the statutory conflict arguably unavoidable. It is not difficult, 
however, to imagine less necessary federal-state conflicts arising 
should Congress decide to promulgate more fracking regulations. 
3. Ownership 
Fracking-related ownership questions usually focus on who owns 
the oil or gas targeted by drilling operations.90 However, because 
operators often contract with other parties for fracking services, tax 
and related liability issues also arise. 
In BJ–Titan Services v. State Tax Commission, for example, the 
Utah Supreme Court held that well operators do not purchase 
tangible personal property, and therefore incur no sales or use tax 
liability, when they pay another company to frack a well.91 The court 
acknowledged that fracking requires chemicals to be “injected into 
the well to stimulate well flow and returned as part of production 
when oil and other fluids are taken from the well.”92 But since the 
value of such injection to the operator “lies purely in the service, not 
in the chemicals,” the court concluded that “there is no real transfer 
of possession or ownership of the chemicals.”93 
Though the opinion focused on ownership for tax purposes, it 
may have implications for lawsuits against well operators. If operators 
who do not frack their own wells fail to acquire ownership of 
fracking fluids for tax purposes, they may argue that only fracking 
companies should be liable for any damage to water or surface lands 
 
 88. Id. at 1052. 
 89. ABA Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Prod. Comm., Annual Report, 2002 
ENV’T ENERGY & RES. L. YEAR REV. 90, 114. 
 90. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 450 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) 
(determining ownership of coalbed gas), rev’d, 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983). 
 91. 842 P.2d 822, 828 (Utah 1992). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
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caused by the fluids (absent, of course, any negligence on the part of 
the operator after the frack job has been completed).94 
4. Damages 
Establishing damages can get particularly complicated when 
hydraulic fracturing is involved. As the Texas Supreme Court 
explained: 
[D]etermining the value of oil and gas drained by hydraulic 
fracturing is the kind of issue the litigation process is least equipped 
to handle. One difficulty is that the material facts are hidden below 
miles of rock, making it difficult to ascertain what might have 
happened. Such difficulty in proof is one of the justifications for the 
rule of capture.95 
Perhaps equally important, however, is the desire of some judges to 
avoid discouraging fracking operations, which have become a crucial 
element of many producing states’ economies. Thus, for both 
evidentiary and economic reasons, suits against fracking companies 
and their operators may be slightly less likely than other tort claims 
to result in large damage awards. This is a reality the Coastal Oil 
court applauded: 
[S]ocial policies, industry operations, and the greater good . . . are 
all tremendously important in deciding whether frac[k]ing should 
or should not be against the law. . .  The experts in this case agree 
on two important things. One is that hydraulic fracturing is not 
optional; it is essential to the recovery of oil and gas in many 
areas . . . . The other is that hydraulic fracturing cannot be 
performed both to maximize reasonable commercial effectiveness 
and to avoid all drainage. Some drainage is virtually unavoidable. In 
 
 94. Admittedly, courts may view this argument as a stretch, and either way it would 
depend on whether the fracking company was acting as the operator’s agent. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965) (“[T]he employer of an independent 
contractor is [generally] not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of 
the contractor or his servants.”). 
 95. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2008); see 
also Ryan Consol. Petroleum Corp. v. Pickens, 285 S.W.2d 201, 235 (Tex. 1955) (Wilson, J., 
dissenting) (“Under our law no one has a right simply to capture the property of someone else. 
But because of early difficulty in determining the source of oil produced from a well we 
stopped judicial inquiry at the mouth of the well, called it the rule of capture, and said that 
adjoining landowners could protect themselves by going and doing likewise. Admittedly this 
was a matter of expediency, and in the then state of the oil business and the then knowledge of 
reservoir dynamics, it reached a practical result.”). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:33 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1758 
this context, common law liability for a long-used practice essential 
to an industry is ill-advised . . . .96 
Each of these legal issues presents a challenge for courts and 
offers fodder for academic discussion. By and large, however, 
proponents of federal regulation appear far more motivated by 
environmental concerns than by a desire to bring states into 
alignment on fracking-related legal questions like trespass and 
pooling. In fact, some scholars view additional federal controls as 
necessary only because common law claims like trespass and nuisance 
often fail, in their opinion, to fully address fracking’s far more 
dangerous environmental effects.97 
B. Environmental Concerns 
Much of the research regarding the potential environmental 
concerns arising from hydraulic fracturing focuses on water issues. A 
2004 EPA study outlined various production activities having the 
potential to injure water quality and quantity, including “surface 
discharge of fracturing and production fluids, aquifer/formation 
dewatering, water withdrawal from production wells, methane 
migration through conduits created by drilling and fracturing 
practices, or any combination of these.”98 Since the most challenging 
fracking questions deal with contamination that cannot be observed, 
this Section limits its discussion to fracking fluids and methane 
migration. 
1. Fracking fluids 
Environmental groups are especially concerned with the fracking 
fluids being used by developers, which the Natural Resource Defense 
Council asserts “are likely to contain toxic and carcinogenic 
chemicals.”99 A question generating much debate is whether these 
 
 96. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 16.  
 97. See Wiseman, supra note 16, at 156. 
 98.  U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF IMPACTS TO UNDERGROUND 
SOURCES OF DRINKING WATER BY HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED METHANE 
RESERVOIRS, EPA 816-R-04-003 at 6-16 (2004) [hereinafter EPA 2004 Study], available at 
http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch06_water_qual_ 
incidents.pdf. 
 99. NATURAL RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF COALBED 
METHANE WELLS: A THREAT TO DRINKING WATER 2 (2002), available at http:// 
www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/200201_NRDC_HydrFrac_CBM.pdf. 
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chemicals regularly make their way into sources of drinking water. 
Fracking opponents argue that they do, and that the effects on those 
using the water are appalling.100 
One Colorado resident, for example, testified before a 
congressional committee in 2007 that when gas wells were drilled 
near his home, a water well on a neighbor’s property exploded, and 
sand built up in his own water filter.101 “If we set a glass of water out 
overnight,” the man testified, “a thin oily film would float on top. 
We stopped drinking it.”102 The water contamination allegedly gave 
his wife “burning eyes and nosebleeds,” as well as “fatigue, 
headaches, hand numbness, bloody stools, rashes, welts and blisters 
on her skin.”103 
Perhaps the most troublesome of all hydrofracking practices 
involves the use of diesel fuel as a fracturing fluid.104 Diesel “may 
contain known carcinogens,” including benzene, toluene, 
ethylbenzene, and xylenes.105 Such compounds make the use of 
diesel fuel especially dangerous because, as the EPA noted, they 
exceed the maximum contaminant levels allowed in underground 
sources of drinking water under federal law “at the point-of-injection 
(i.e. the subsurface location where fracturing fluids are initially 
injected).”106 
As a result, diesel fuel is the only fracking fluid regulated by the 
EPA under the Safe Drinking Water Act.107 In addition, the three 
major U.S. fracturing companies (who together perform ninety-five 
percent of all fracking jobs in the country) entered into an agreement 
with the EPA “to eliminate diesel fuel from hydraulic fracturing 
fluids injected directly into [underground sources of drinking water] 
 
 100. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 138. 
 101.  Curtis Hewston, A Death in Colorado, THE BLUE HIGHWAY (Jan. 26, 2011, 2:17 
PM), http://thebluehighway.com/?p=2125 (last visited Sep. 9, 2011). 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. See also Wiseman, supra note 16, at 138–39 (summarizing this same testimony). 
 104. See Wiseman, supra note 16, at 139 (“[T]here is a strong consensus against one 
practice: frac[k]ing with diesel fuel.”). 
 105. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 4-4, 4-11, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf. 
 106. Id. at 4-11. 
 107. See 42 U.S.C. §300h(d)(1) (2006) (“The term ‘underground injection’ . . . 
excludes . . . the underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other than diesel fuels) 
pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations related to oil, gas, or geothermal production 
activities.” (emphasis added)). 
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to stimulate coalbed methane production.”108 In early 2011, several 
members of Congress accused the companies of violating the 
agreement when disclosures showed that diesel is still being used as a 
fracking fluid.109 It is unclear, however, whether it has been used in 
any fracturing applications in or near drinking water sources.110 
2. Methane contamination 
Fracking fluids are not the only potential source of 
contamination. A number of critics fear that hydraulic fracturing 
causes “connections between coal formation[s] and underground 
water sources.”111 Articles in recent years have revealed a “string of 
documented cases of gas escaping into drinking water,”112 which 
some local governments say can be linked to increased gas drilling 
(though studies are not conclusive).113 Investigators found methane 
in the drinking water of a Pennsylvania resident’s home in 2009, for 
example, after an explosion occurred in her basement when she was 
not home.114 Gas operators had been drilling just a few hundred 
yards from her house at the time.115 Other residents in the area 
reported water well explosions, and the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Protection eventually charged a gas operator with 
regulatory violations involving faulty well casings.116 
 
 108. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 4-19, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf. 
 109. See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Fracking Companies Injected 32M Gallons of Diesel, House 
Probe Finds, CITIZENS FOR A HEALTHY COMMUNITY (Jan. 31, 2011), http:// 
citizensforahealthycommunity.org/news/news-fracking-companies-injected-32m-gallons-of-
diesel-house-probe-finds. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 142. 
 112. Abrahm Lustgarten, Officials in Three States Pin Water Woes on Gas Drilling, 
PROPUBLICA (Apr. 26, 2009, 7:00 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/officials-in-
three-states-pin-water-woes-on-gas-drilling-426. 
 113. See, e.g., GEOFFREY THYNE, REVIEW OF PHASE II HYDROGEOLOGIC STUDY FOR 
GARFIELD COUNTY 2–3 (2008), available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/propublica/ 
assets/methane/thyne_review.pdf (Garfield County, Colorado study noting a trend of 
increasing methane and chloride levels in groundwater “coincident with [an] increased number 
of gas wells” but also noting that values are still “below regulatory limits” and that “[t]he 
number of water wells . . . and their spatial distribution is inadequate to monitor and locate 
potential source of contamination from the more than 1400 potential point sources . . . .”). 
 114. Lustgarten, supra note 112. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. As Lustgarten’s article describes, “drilling companies insert as many as three 
concentric rings of steel pipes inside the well bore to isolate what flows through them. . . . 
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In its 2004 study, the EPA noted that citizens in Wyoming, 
Montana, Alabama, Virginia, West Virginia, Colorado, and New 
Mexico had contacted the Agency with concerns that coalbed 
methane production had affected their water wells.117 Many of the 
complaints were limited to water loss, but citizens also described 
water well contamination and increased methane levels inside 
homes.118 
The environmental concerns have prompted a push among legal 
scholars and interest groups for more federal regulatory 
intervention.119 One group, for example, calls the exemption of 
fracking fluids from the Safe Drinking Water Act “bad environmental 
policy.”120 And EarthWorks has criticized the decision as “making oil 
and gas the only industry allowed to inject toxic fluids directly into 
good quality groundwater without oversight by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency.”121 
What is conspicuously missing from many of these groups’ 
arguments, however, is an explanation of how and why federal 
regulation will actually diminish fracking’s environmental risks. In 
fact, a closer look at much of the rhetoric against a state-centric 
regulatory system reveals not so much a push for federal regulation, 
but rather for federal prohibition of hydraulic fracturing.122 Perhaps 
 
[W]here extra protection is needed . . . concrete is pumped into the gap between the rings of 
pipe to ensure an impenetrable seal.” Id. When this casing and cementing is done correctly, 
“the issue of groundwater contamination, whether from gas or hydraulic fracturing, goes 
away.” Id. Thus, it appears these Pennsylvania incidents had more to do with the operator’s 
violations of standard casing regulations than with anything related specifically to hydraulic 
fracturing. 
 117. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 6-1, 6-2, available at http:// 
www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch06_water_qual_incidents.pdf. 
 118. Id. at 6-2 to 6-5, 6-9 to 6-11, 6-13. 
 119. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 16, at 145 (“Several environmental groups have 
continued to push for federal regulation . . . .”); Cupas, supra note 16.  
 120. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 145 (quoting THE WILDERNESS SOCIETY, TOO WILD 
TO DRILL: HYDRAULIC FRACTURING THREATENS DRINKING WATER). 
 121. EARTHWORKS, OIL & GAS ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, 
available at  http:// www.earthworksaction.org/pubs/Fracking.pdf. 
 122. See, e.g., Hydraulic Fracturing, ‘Fracking,’ Banned In Buffalo, NY, REUTERS, Feb. 
9, 2011, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/09/hydraulic-fracturing-
bann_n_820647.html (reporting that opponents have succeeded in getting fracking banned in 
several U.S. cities, including Buffalo and Pittsburgh); Brian Tumulty, ‘Gasland’ director calls 
for natural gas moratorium, PRESSCONNECTS.COM (Feb. 18, 2011, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.pressconnects.com/article/20110218/NEWS01/102180305/-Gasland-
director-calls-natural-gas-moratorium (reporting that Josh Fox, the director of “Gasland,” an 
Academy Award-nominated documentary about fracking, has asked President Obama for a 
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this is because, by and large, state control of hydrofracking is already 
relatively expansive. 
C. Increasing State Controls 
As fracking has become more widespread, state regulation of the 
practice has intensified, although specific rules vary widely.123 Some 
see this variation as a reason for more federal control.124 But as the 
following discussion illustrates, every producing state has 
promulgated a considerable amount of fracking regulation, whether 
through general permitting processes or more directly.125 
Wyoming, for example, was the first state to require companies 
to fully disclose the chemicals used in their fracking fluids.126 The 
state also requires drillers to give notice to surface owners of planned 
oil and gas operations on their lands and make good faith efforts to 
enter into “surface use agreements” that will protect surface 
resources, provide for reclamation of disturbed areas, and determine 
a payment for any damages caused by the operations.127 Developers 
must show that they have complied with this requirement before the 
 
nationwide fracking moratorium). 
 123. MARK ZOBACK ET AL., BRIEFING PAPER 1: ADDRESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
RISKS FROM SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT 13 (2010), available at 
http://efdsystems.org/Portals/25/Hydraulic%20Fracturing%20Paper%20-
%20World%20Watch.pdf. 
 124. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 16, at 167 (“The varying complexity and breadth of 
state oil and gas regulations suggests that some states are not adequately protecting 
underground sources of drinking water – sources that are of federal concern – from the impacts 
of frac[k]ing.”). Professor Wiseman comes dangerously close to mischaracterizing the current 
state of fracking regulation in her article. “[S]ome [states] decline to regulate,” she states in 
her introduction. Id. at 116. As support for this assertion, she quotes a line from the Coastal 
Oil opinion, which, in reality, refers, not to a general lack of fracking regulation in the U.S., 
but rather to a single state agency’s decision to regulate fracking indirectly through general 
permitting procedures. Id. (quoting Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 
S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2008)). She acknowledges this fact much later in her article, id. at 157, but 
her original statement seems inappropriately misleading in light of the numerous provisions 
adopted in every producing state that significantly limit what fracking companies can do. 
 125. The purpose of this Section is not to provide a comprehensive review of every 
producing state’s oil and gas regulations. Rather, what follows is intended to illustrate both the 
variety of state approaches to fracking issues and the heightened scrutiny with which most state 
regulatory bodies now view the practice. 
 126. See Dustin Bleizeffer, Wyoming Approves ‘Fracking’ Disclosure Rules, TRIB.COM, 
Jun. 9, 2010, http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_069139a4-5b9b-51c3-a599-
a38f788e8ff4.html (reporting that state regulators in 2010 approved rules “requiring oil and 
gas companies to disclose chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing”). 
 127. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-402 (2010). 
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Wyoming Oil and Gas Commission will grant a permit to drill128 or a 
permit to construct a pit for retaining fluids.129 Moreover, before any 
well can be used for injection activities, an operator must 
demonstrate to the Commission that its casing is leak-proof and able 
to withstand pressures of at least 300 pounds per square inch.130 
New York has perhaps the nation’s strictest fracking controls. 
Shortly before leaving office in late 2010, former governor David 
Paterson “issued an executive order imposing a moratorium on 
permits for horizontal wells and instruct[ed] the [Department of 
Environmental Conservation] to revise its draft of standards 
governing the use of high-volume fracking.”131 In July of 2011, the 
Agency released a revised Draft Supplemental Generic 
Environmental Impact Statement (SGEIS) which recommended that 
the moratorium be kept in place in certain areas and lifted in others, 
subject to strict regulation.132  
Even without the moratorium, the state’s rules are far from 
lenient. An operator seeking to drill needs to submit an application 
for a permit, pay a permit fee, offer a description of the planned 
drilling project, provide three copies of a plat, and complete an 
Environmental Assessment Form.133 This form “provides information 
about the physical setting of the proposed project, the general 
character of the land and land use, the projected size of the area that 
will be disturbed and the length of time the drilling rig will be on the 
 
 128. 055-003 WYO. CODE R. § 8(d) (2011). 
 129. 055-004 WYO. CODE R. § 1(d) (2011). 
 130. Id. at § 8. 
 131. Bonner R. Cohen, Outgoing New York Governor Fires Final Shot on Fracking, 
HEARTLANDER, Feb. 7, 2011, http://www.heartland.org/full/29294/ 
Outgoing_New_York_Governor_Fires_Final_Shot_on_Fracking.html. 
 132. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, FACT SHEET: 2011 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PERMITTING HIGH-VOLUME HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN NEW 
YORK STATE (July 2011), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/docs/materials_minerals_pdf/ 
sgeisgenfs092011.pdf. Specifically, the SGEIS recommends prohibiting drilling within the 
Syracuse and New York City watersheds, and within 2000 feet of public drinking water 
supplies, among other areas. Where fracking is allowed, the report recommends requiring 
additional well casing to prevent gas migration and imposing limits on withdrawals from 
surface water bodies. It also recommends new rules governing chemical disclosure and requires 
operators to get DEC approval before disposing of flowback water. Id. 
 133. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, WELL PERMITTING PROCESS: WELL 
PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS TO DRILL, DEEPEN, PLUG BACK AND CONVERT FOR OIL, GAS, 
SOLUTION SALT MINING AND OTHER REGULATED WELLS (2011), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1772.html. 
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site.”134 A Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement and 
additional permits may also be necessary.135 Even Professor Wiseman 
calls the state’s fracking rules “relatively comprehensive.”136 
She says the same about Pennsylvania, even though the state uses 
general oil and gas rules to regulate fracking.137 Strong permitting 
requirements compel operators to account for any water sources or 
coal seams near drilling sites,138 and the Department of 
Environmental Protection may deny permits that would violate any 
applicable environmental law.139 The state also has separate rules for 
exploration activities in the Marcellus Shale.140 
Likewise, Colorado has adopted comprehensive fracking 
regulations. In 2009, the state overhauled its rules, providing more 
protections against methane contamination.141 Even before the 
overhaul, the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission 
(COGCC) instituted a “mitigation program” to seal improperly 
abandoned wells. The program resulted in a reduction of methane 
concentrations in close to 30% of all sampled water wells.142 More 
recently, the Commission has begun investigating the use of diesel 
fuel in fracking operations and regularly testing groundwater wells 
for contamination.143 The COGCC also requires operators to 
maintain a “Chemical Inventory” of all chemicals used in drilling and 
completion, including fracturing, at each well site.144 
The Alabama Oil and Gas Board claims that it “investigates every 
complaint it receives.”145 A unique feature of its investigations is that 
each one includes research regarding “historical water quality 
 
 134. N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, DIVISION OF MINERAL RESOURCES 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FORM (EAF) FOR WELL PERMITTING (2011), available at 
http://www.dec.ny.gov/energy/1777.html. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 116. 
 137. Id. at 116, 163. 
 138. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 601.201(b) (2010). 
 139. Id. at 201(e)(1). 
 140. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 163. 
 141. Lustgarten, supra note 112. 
 142. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 6-5. 
 143. Press Releaase, Dep’t of Natural Res., State of Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation 
Comm’n, New Website to Provide Data on Hydraulic Fracturing Chemicals in Colorado (Apr. 
7, 2011), available at http://dnr.state.co.us/SiteCollectionDocuments/News/ 
Fracking%20disclosure.pdf. 
 144. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:205.c (2011). 
 145. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 6-11. 
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data.”146 As the EPA explains, this “information is important because 
the coal-bearing Pottsville Formation often contains high 
concentrations of iron.”147 The symptoms of iron staining, which can 
occur suddenly and “in water with a history of good quality,” are 
apparently similar to those of methane contamination.148 Such 
observations show the importance of accounting for regional 
characteristics in fracking regulations. 
Perhaps more than any other state, Texas has been criticized for 
its fracking regulations, primarily because until recently no rule 
addressed the practice specifically.149 That changed in June of 2011, 
when Texas governor Rick Perry signed into law H.B. 3328, which 
requires operators to publicly disclose chemicals used in fracturing 
applications.150 Even without the legislation, much of the criticism of 
Texas is misplaced, since, as Professor Wiseman herself admits, many 
of the state’s general oil and gas regulations “apply to various 
components of the frac[k]ing process.”151 Like other states, operators 
cannot drill without a permit,152 and they must obtain a Water Board 
Letter from the state Commission on Environmental Quality setting 
out “the depth to which fresh water must be protected” for each 
well.153 No operator in the state “may dispose of any oil and gas 
wastes [which would include fracking fluids] by any method without 
obtaining a permit.”154 In addition, the state has extensive casing and 
cementing regulations, including requirements that all casing be 
 
 146. Id. at 6-11. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See id. at 6-10 to 6-12. The EPA study does not explicitly compare the symptoms of 
iron staining to that of methane contamination. It notes, however, that complaints about 
methane contamination have included reports of “black coal fines,” unpleasant odors, oily 
substances, and “jelly-like grease.” Id. at 6-10–6-11. Conversely, iron staining can result in 
black stains, unpleasant odors, oily films, and “gelatinous material.” Id. at 6-12. The symptoms 
seem sufficiently similar that misplaced complaints are at least possible (if not probable in some 
cases). 
 149. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 16, at 116 (“In Texas . . . ‘neither the Legislature nor 
the [Railroad] Commission has ever seen fit’ to regulate hydrofracturing.” (quoting Coastal 
Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tex. 2008))). 
 150. H.B. 3328, 82d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011). 
 151. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 157. 
 152. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.5(a) (2011). 
 153. Barnett Shale Information: Top Questions Asked About the Barnett Shale, R.R. 
COMM’N OF TEX., http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/barnettshale/index.php#faqs (last updated 
Aug. 4, 2011) (follow “Is an oil or gas operator required to perform an environmental study or 
something similar?” link). 
 154. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d)(1) (2011). 
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made of steel and “hydrostatically pressure tested,” and that “all 
usable-quality water zones be isolated and sealed off to effectively 
prevent contamination or harm.”155 
Despite the peculiarities of each state’s regulatory system, almost 
all share several common features. Every producing state, for 
example, has “permitting requirements governing the locating, 
drilling, completion, and operations of wells.”156 Almost all have 
casing and cementing requirements designed to isolate ground water 
from production zones.157 Every state but one requires regulatory 
authorization before operators can leave a well idle.158 And all 
twenty-seven producing states have regulations regarding the proper 
plugging of wells.159 
Given the level of scrutiny most states are already applying to 
hydraulic fracturing, it is difficult to see how federal agencies could 
significantly curb any of the few environmental effects left 
unaddressed. Congress’s decision in 2005 to exempt most aspects of 
fracking from federal regulation has been criticized as a “loophole” 
for developers.160 But as the Independent Petroleum Association of 
America states, “This characterization is entirely inaccurate; 
Congress’ action merely keeps in place a system that has worked for 
half a century.”161 
IV. STATE-CENTRIC SOLUTIONS ARE BEST 
A. Exaggerated Environmental Concerns 
An initial reason to avoid the excesses of additional federal 
regulation is that many of the environmental effects of hydraulic 
fracturing appear to be overblown. As the EPA acknowledged, the 
same water problems for which fracking is often blamed could easily 
be caused by “naturally occurring conditions, population growth and 
 
 155. Id. at § 3.13(a)(1), (b)(1)(A). 
 156. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STATE OIL AND NATURAL GAS REGULATIONS DESIGNED 
TO PROTECT WATER RESOURCES 17 (2009), available at http://www.gwpc.org/e-
library/documents/general/State%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Regulations%20Designed%20to%
20Protect%20Water%20Resources.pdf. 
 157. Id. at 19. 
 158. Id. at 25. 
 159. Id. at 26. 
 160. See, e.g., Editorial, The Halliburton Loophole, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at A28, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/03/opinion/03tue3.html. 
 161. INDEP. PETROLEUM ASS’N OF AM., supra note 13. 
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historical practices.”162 In fact, a specialist with the State Department 
of Environmental Conservation in New York has argued that 
complaints regarding fracking stem more from “surface 
mismanagement of frac[k]ing fluid than the actual fracturing of the 
formation.”163 
1. Fluid dilution 
In its 2004 study, the EPA concluded that “the injection of 
hydraulic fracturing fluids into coalbed methane wells poses little or 
no threat to [underground sources of drinking water].”164 In fact, 
“the largest portion of fracturing fluid constituents is nontoxic 
(>95% by volume).”165 Of the portion that does contain 
contaminants, “dilution and dispersion, adsorption, and potentially 
biodegradation, minimize the possibility that chemicals included in 
the fracturing fluids would adversely affect [underground sources of 
drinking water].”166 The Agency was so confident in its findings that 
it dismissed proposals for additional study of fracking as not worth 
the expense.167 
Part of the reason for the EPA’s confidence is the significant 
amount of dilution that occurs before fracking fluids are ever 
injected into a well. The EPA found that for every four to ten gallons 
of fracking gel (which could include diesel fuel and other potentially 
hazardous fluids as well as nonhazardous fluids) used in the drilling 
process, companies mix in approximately 1,000 gallons of water.168 
Such a mixture makes toxic substances like benzene, which has a 
negligible presence in relation to the entire amount of fracking fluid 
used,169 almost nonexistent by the time an operator finishes pumping 
much of the fluid back to the surface.170  
 
 162. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 6-16. 
 163. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 141 (footnote omitted). 
 164. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 7-5, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch07_conclusions.pdf. 
 165. Id. at 7-3. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 7-5. 
 168. Id. at 4-4, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/ 
cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf. 
 169. Id. (Benzene can comprise “between 0.003 percent to 0.1 percent by weight of 
diesel fuel.”). 
 170. Id. at 4-14. At least one study predicted that between 68% and 82% of all fracking 
fluids are eventually pumped back out of the well. Id. at 4-15. 
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Moreover, aside from diesel fuel, the EPA does not consider 
most fracking fluids to be environmentally hazardous. Often, 
fracking gels consist of nothing more than “water or nitrogen foam”; 
in some cases, “[w]ater with a simple sand proppant can be adequate 
to achieve a desired fracture.”171 Numerous fracturing fluids contain 
only harmless ingredients, and (other than diesel) even those with 
potentially toxic additives simply do not contain contaminants “in 
concentrations high enough to pose a significant threat.”172 
2. Deep formations 
Even if fracking fluids were highly toxic, they would still not 
affect drinking water in many places because shales are generally 
located thousands of feet below aquifers. The EPA found that 
“[o]ften, a high stress contrast between adjacent geologic strata 
results in a barrier to fracture propagation.”173 In other words, 
fractures generally tend to remain within an operator’s target 
formation. What this means in terms of most shale drilling is that the 
chance of a fracture extending from the a well’s bottom hole location 
to near-surface drinking water sources is infinitesimally small. As 
Zoback notes, with only a few exceptions, “many thousands of feet 
of rock separate most major gas-bearing shale formations in the 
United States from the base of aquifers that contain drinkable 
water.”174 In Ohio, for example, gas is often produced from nearly 
3700 feet underground,175 and developers in Pennsylvania and 
Colorado commonly drill down more than two miles to reach their 
target depths.176 
Of course, this is not always the case. Some shales, like the 
Antrim in Michigan and the New Albany in Illinois, are relatively 
shallow formations.177 Even then, methane migration can often be 
traced to natural, preexisting cracks in underground rock.178 Such 
 
 171. Id. at 4-19, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/ 
cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf. 
 172. Id. at 4-17. 
 173. Id. at 7-5, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/ 
cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch07_conclusions.pdf. 
 174. ZOBACK, supra note 123, at 7. 
 175. Lustgarten, supra note 112. 
 176. Id. 
 177. ZOBACK, supra note 123, at 7. 
 178. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 7-5, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
ogwdw/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch07_conclusions.pdf. 
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natural connections might create concern about fracking fluid 
contamination, but, as the EPA noted, the effects of dilution, 
recovery, and other factors significantly mitigates this threat.179 
3. Individual complaints about fracking may be better explained by 
other conditions 
Despite the numerous complaints of water contamination 
included in the EPA’s 2004 study, the Agency was not convinced 
that they were all fracking-related.180 Other possible causes include 
surface spills of drilling fluids and badly sealed or deserted wells.181 
The COGCC, for example, believes that at least some of its methane 
contamination problems have been caused by “old, improperly 
abandoned” wells rather than by fracturing.182 
Moreover, contamination can easily occur without any oil or gas 
production. In many places, shallow water wells were already 
producing methane or emitting strong sulfur odors before drilling 
operations began.183 Past documented methane occurrences have led 
the EPA to conclude that “natural fractures” rather than (or perhaps 
in addition to) man-made fractures “probably serve as conduits” 
from shallow coal formations to even shallower aquifers.184 
Such findings should not be read to imply that every 
hydrofracking complaint should be dismissed. On the contrary, 
documented cases of methane contamination (like those in 
Pennsylvania185) show signs of disturbing problems that only an 
irresponsible operator would ignore. But while such incidents are 
illustrative of the potential dangers involved in drilling near methane 
deposits, they also serve as examples of what appear to be swift, 
effective, appropriate, and, as far as can determined, typical state 
responses to the dangers.186 These state responses further indicate 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 6-1, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/uic/pdfs/ 
cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch06_water_qual_incidents.pdf. 
 181. Id. at 6-1 to 6-2. 
 182. Id at 6-5. 
 183. Id. at 6-6. 
 184. Id. at 6-8. 
 185. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 186. See Lustgarten, supra note 112 (describing how, after several methane explosions in 
Pennsylvania, the state’s “Department of Environmental Protection charged Cabot Oil & Gas 
with two violations [of state rules] that it says caused the contamination”; and, after methane 
levels rose in western Colorado, a county conducted an “exhaustive” study of the problem, and 
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that additional federal intervention, while sure to be costly and 
potentially problematic, would probably not contribute more than 
state regulators already provide. 
4. Defending the EPA’s 2004 study 
With so much evidence in the EPA’s study pointing to both the 
relative safety of hydraulic fracturing as well as the admirable work of 
state regulatory bodies in dealing with its environmental concerns, it 
seems only natural that fracking opponents would look for ways to 
attack the report’s legitimacy. Some were less reasoned than others, 
of course. Alan Septoff, writing for an EarthWorks blog, simply 
declared that “[t]here’s ample reason to believe the 2004 study got 
it wrong.”187 He called the report “a ‘get-out-of-enforcement-free-
card’ for the drilling industry” and as support cited EarthWork’s own 
review of the study, which, not surprisingly, also concluded that the 
EPA got it wrong.188 
Other critiques were more scholarly. Professor Wiseman, for 
example, has attacked the EPA report as “too general to provide 
adequate data,”189 possibly biased,190 possibly based on “bent” or 
outcome-driven science,191 and possibly suffering from hidden or 
omitted information.192 The operative word, of course, is “possibly,” 
since there is little evidence to back up the accusations. She admits, 
for example, that “there is no information suggesting that the 
[EPA’s scientific and peer-review] panel was in fact biased.”193 And 
the only instance of possible data “hiding” mentioned in her article 
appears to be nothing more than a minor revision in the EPA 
report.194  
 
the state “overhauled” its oil and gas regulations). 
 187. Alan Septoff, EPA to Study Hydraulic Fracturing, Again. This Time (Hopefully) with 
Science, EARTHWORKS EARTHBLOG (Mar. 19, 2010, 12:48 PM), http://earthblog.org/ 
content/epa-study-hydraulic-fracturing-again-time-hopefully-science. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 176. 
 190. Id. at 173. 
 191. Id. at 171. 
 192. Id. at 173. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. at 173–75. As the EPA explained, after industry feedback revealed an 
inaccuracy in the Agency’s initial measures of fracking gel-water mixtures, it revised its point-
of-injection concentration figures. Democrat Henry Waxman, then the ranking minority 
member of the House Committee on Government Reform, attacked the revision as an 
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In truth, the study was never designed to be scientifically 
meticulous. Rather, as a “Phase I” analysis, evaluations of fracking’s 
effect on drinking water were “conducted to provide the Agency 
with information on whether a Phase II study [was] warranted.”195 
Professor Wiseman acknowledges this, admitting that the details she 
believes are lacking in the report “may have been too specific for an 
EPA ‘Phase I study.’”196 What she and other critics ignore, however, 
is that such a detailed study could only be financially justified if the 
EPA’s “Phase I” evaluation had uncovered fracking problems 
significant enough to warrant a second look. That was simply not the 
case, yet fracking opponents continue to insist on conducting what 
essentially amounts to another expensive197 fishing expedition. At 
this point, it seems unlikely that even a second study that revealed no 
new significant environmental concerns would satisfy those who 
favor stricter federal controls. 
Of course, not every complaint about fracking should be 
dismissed. The legitimacy of environmentalists’ concerns about the 
practice, however, does not demand, or even justify, additional 
federal regulation. 
B. Federal v. State: Why “Spotty” Regulation is Better Regulation 
The push for more federal control of hydraulic fracturing seems 
at least partly motivated by differences in state approaches to the 
issue. Professor Wiseman, for example, argues that “[t]he varying 
complexity and breadth of state oil and gas regulation suggests that 
some states are not adequately protecting underground sources of 
drinking water.”198 The flaw in such arguments, however, is that they 
 
“alteration of the data,” complaining that the EPA’s explanation only exacerbated his concerns 
that the agency was “altering, misusing, or ignoring technical data in a manner that benefits 
Halliburton.” Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, H. Comm. on 
Gov’t Reform, to Christine Todd Whitman, Adm’r, EPA (Oct. 8, 2002), available at 
http://waxman.house.gov/UploadedFiles/Letter_to_EPA_Oct_8.pdf. In reality, the most 
significant change effected by the revision was an adjustment of the high estimate of benzene 
levels at the edge of a fracture zone from 8.46 µg/L to 2.62 µg/L—a reduction of less than 5 
millionths of a gram per liter. Id. 
 195. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 4-1, available at http://www.epa.gov/ 
safewater/uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf.  
 196. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 176. 
 197. A new EPA fracking study, for example, would cost “more than $1.9 million.” 
Septoff, supra note 187. 
 198. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 167. 
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ignore the fact that the depth, accessibility, extraction techniques, 
and characteristics of oil and gas reserves vary from state to state. In 
fact, that fracking regulation in the United States has been 
“spotty”199 may actually be a good thing. 
1. Regional differences 
In many respects, the more local and specialized the regulation, 
the better. This is true primarily because oil and gas extraction 
methods, and therefore hydrofracking techniques, are almost always 
geologic- and region-specific.200 This fact makes additional federal 
regulation unnecessary at best and potentially extremely problematic 
if it conflicts with local and state land use controls. 
The Texas Supreme Court hinted at this idea in the Coastal Oil 
opinion.201 A major basis for the court’s decision was the desirability 
of deferring to the Texas Railroad Commission on oil and gas 
matters, especially where they involve questions of property 
boundaries and extraction techniques within specific reserves.202 The 
Commission has the luxury of focusing all its time and manpower on 
oil and gas regulation (something the court lacks) and has sufficient 
remedial authority to enforce its rules in a way that both protects 
landowners203 and promotes “the state’s goals of preventing waste 
and conserving natural resources.”204 Such realities make the 
Commission, not the court, the appropriate entity for formulating 
effective regulatory provisions. 
For similar reasons, federal intervention into state regulation of 
fracking seems unnecessary. Just as a commission’s staff of experts is 
better equipped than judges to promulgate rules for state oil and gas 
development, state officials are generally more informed about local 
and regional production techniques than federal regulators.205 Not 
 
 199. Id. at 142. 
 200. See, e.g., PHI NGUYAN, WASHINGTON INTERNSHIPS FOR STUDENTS OF 
ENGINEERING, REGULATORY OPTIONS & CHALLENGES IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 7 
(2010) (“Shale deposits can be found throughout the United States—each in its own basin, 
which is why operational criteria vary with each location.”). 
 201. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008). 
 202.  Id. at 38–39. 
 203. As the court noted, “[n]o one suggests that these various remedies provide 
inadequate protection against drainage.” Id. at 14. 
 204. Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 205. See Robert L. Glicksman & Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on 
Ceiling Preemption by Federal Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 
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only do many energy-producing states operate under somewhat 
conflicting theories of oil and gas law,206 but the state commissions 
that design rules that conform to those theories must be aware of the 
location, form, and accessibility of their hydrocarbon reserves in 
order to effectively regulate. 
Of course, federal agencies can set up regional offices, and 
federal regulators can familiarize themselves with local industry 
realities, but federal employees will never be subject to the same kind 
of political accountability as state officials, and this may make them 
less receptive to local concerns. Perhaps more importantly, federal 
officials remain bound by federal directives drawn up by bureaucrats 
who reside far from most of the reserves their regulations affect. 
Ironically, even proponents of federal regulation acknowledge 
the need for region-specific fracking rules. Professor Wiseman notes 
that, “[i]nvariably, effects will differ by region, by the type of 
operation and disposal methods used, and the type of formation 
frac[k]ed.”207 State officials are arguably more familiar with these 
variables than federal employees, yet she promotes an additional, 
potentially burdensome layer of federal control.208 This seems 
shortsighted simply because what works well in one state may work 
poorly in another. 
This reality has long been a burr in the side of would-be federal 
mining regulators. Despite widespread expansion of national 
environmental protections throughout the twentieth century,209 
Congress struggled to craft effective mining legislation. This was 
primarily because geological and regional differences encouraged a 
 
102 NW. U. L. REV. 579, 592 (2008) (“Because state governments are more directly 
accountable and more familiar with regional conditions, they are generally in a better position 
than the federal government to make policy judgments for their constituencies.”). 
 206. For example, not all states adhere to the ownership-in-place theory. See supra notes 
63–66 and accompanying text. 
 207. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 141. 
 208. Id. at 194. 
 209. This expansion began in the early 1900s, largely at the urging of Theodore 
Roosevelt, who “did far more for the long-term protection of wilderness than all of his White 
House predecessors combined.” DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE WILDERNESS WARRIOR: 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE CRUSADE FOR AMERICA 20 (2009). The federal 
environmental movement picked up steam once again in the 1960s and 1970s with the passage 
of the National Environmental Policy Act (1969), Clean Air Act (1970), Clean Water Act 
(1972), Endangered Species Act (1973), Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), and Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (1976), among others. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVTL SCI. 217 
(David E. Alexander & Rhodes W. Fairbridge eds., 1999). 
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state-centric regulatory scheme.210 A former government attorney 
who helped draft the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
of 1977 pointed out that coal regulation “differs significantly from 
other federal environmental regulatory statutes” primarily because of 
“the ‘diversity’ in coal mining areas.”211 This concern eventually 
resulted in Congress admitting that “the primary governmental 
authority for developing, authorizing, issuing, and enforcing 
[mining] regulations . . . should rest with the States.”212 
Such diversity is even more apparent among oil and gas 
formations. A comparison of operations in the Bakken Shale with 
those in the Barnett Shale is illustrative. Bakken companies primarily 
drill for oil,213 while Barnett operators produce gas.214 Typical 
spacing in the Bakken can be as much as 1280 acres per well,215 as 
opposed to Barnett spacing, which rarely exceeds 100 acres.216 This, 
of course, creates far fewer wells in the Bakken states and thus a 
better opportunity to avoid drilling near communities. Likewise, 
Bakken states (Montana and North Dakota) are largely rural to begin 
with, making land use decisions simpler and disputes regarding 
property lines and leasehold interests less common. 
Even the use of fracking fluids varies widely by field and 
formation. As the EPA noted, “[o]n any one fracturing job, different 
fluids may be used in combination or alone at different stages in the 
fracturing process. Experienced service company engineers will devise 
the most effective fracturing scheme, based on formation 
 
 210. Edward M. Green, State and Federal Roles Under the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 531, 535–36 (1997). 
 211. Id. at 535. 
 212. Id. at 535–36 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 30 U.S.C. § 1201(f) 
(1994)). 
 213. Press Release, U.S. Geological Survey, 3 to 4.3 Billion Barrels of Technically 
Recoverably Oil Assessed in N.D. & Mont.’s Bakken Formation—25 Times More Than 1995 
Estimate (Apr. 10, 2008),  available at http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/ 
article.asp?ID=1911. 
 214. Marc Airhart, The Barnett Shale Gas Boom, GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/ 
research/barnett-shale-gas.shtml (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
 215. See FAQ’s, N.D. PETROLEUM COUNCIL, http://www.ndoil.org/?id=77&offset=55 
(under question “How does horizontal drilling affect the environment?”) (last visited Mar. 1, 
2011) (“The typical new Bakken well uses a 5 acre surface location that is reclaimed to about 
two acres for production to develop 1,280 acres of minerals.”). 
 216. See JEFF HAYDEN & DAVE PURSELL, PICKERING ENERGY PARTNERS, INC., THE 
BARNETT SHALE: VISITORS GUIDE TO THE HOTTEST GAS PLAY IN THE US 27 (2005), 
available at http://www.tudorpickering.com/Websites/tudorpickering/Images/ 
Reports%20Archives/TheBarnettShaleReport.pdf. 
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characteristics, using the fracturing fluid combination they deem 
most effective.”217 Fracking companies in Montana, for example, 
“have been using relatively non-intrusive fluids—mostly a gel water 
sand frac[k], with the gel consisting of a drilling mud or a 
polymer.”218 In Pennsylvania’s Marcellus Shale, on the other hand, 
there have been reports of higher than expected levels of radiation in 
wastewater from fracked wells.219 
Arguments for more federal intervention consistently fail to 
account for these realities. Professor Wiseman writes, for example, 
that an “absence of regulation [would] not [be] of great concern if 
frac[k]ing [were] a relatively benign practice that c[ould] be 
sufficiently controlled through the general permitting process; but if 
frac[k]ing has significant environmental and public health impacts, 
the lack of regulation is problematic.”220 The problem with such an 
all-or-nothing analysis is that fracking is both benign and 
environmentally hazardous—depending on its location.221 In some 
states, the general permitting process provides adequate 
environmental protections; in others, more stringent rules are 
justified.222 But these are decisions that ought to be left to state 
policymakers and state regulatory agencies, not federal employees 
who may be ignorant to specific local and regional practices and may 
thus rely on articles like Wiseman’s, which downplay the importance 
of geological dissimilarities and variations in fracking technique. 
With state regulations already providing extensive environmental 
protections, additional federal fracking controls, in all likelihood, can 
 
 217. EPA 2004 Study, supra note 98, at 4-2, available at http://www.epa.gov/ogwdw/ 
uic/pdfs/cbmstudy_attach_uic_ch04_hyd_frac_fluids.pdf. 
 218. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 141 (citations omitted). 
 219. Don Hopey & Daniel Malloy, Radiation in Fracking Fluid Is a New Concern, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 1, 2011, at A.1. 
 220. Wiseman, supra note 16, at 116. 
 221. Of course, this is not the only problem with Professor Wiseman’s statement. As 
noted above, to characterize any producing state’s approach to fracking as an “absence” of 
regulation borders on bold-faced propaganda. See supra Part III.C. 
 222. In states such as Pennsylvania, for example, where permitting rules incorporate other 
environmental regulations and require operators to account for water resources near drill sites, 
additional fracking-specific requirements would arguably be unnecessary. See supra notes 137–
39 and accompanying text. The same could be said for states like Montana, where urban 
drilling is rarely a concern and operators use nonintrusive fracking fluids. See supra notes 215, 
218 and accompanying text. On the other hand, in areas where fracturing could significantly 
interfere with crucial land and water use plans—as it might within the New York and Syracuse 
watersheds—public health concerns may demand separate rules for fracked wells.  See supra 
note 132 and accompanying text. 
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have only one of two effects: either (1) they will “have little impact,” 
representing “no more than ideological tinkering with state law”;223 
or (2) they will alter the entire state-centric system, essentially 
voiding many workable state rules, creating overlapping controls that 
slow down domestic oil and gas production, and producing uniform 
standards for fracking techniques that ought to vary by field and 
region. 
Should Congress opt for such a uniform system, the safest route 
would be to force all states to adopt stringent fracking rules. The 
problem is that while such regulations might be appropriate and 
welcomed in New York, they could be unnecessarily restrictive in 
states like Montana and North Dakota. At the same time, crafting a 
middle-of-the-road national standard could send the message that 
stricter requirements are unnecessary.224 
2. Federal regulatory failures  
Obviously, only a shortsighted system would fail to account for 
at least some regional and geological differences. But even if each 
state’s reserves were identical, no evidence suggests that federal 
fracking regulation would be superior to state control. In fact, the 
BP spill and other recent energy industry problems have created 
concerns that the entire federal energy regulatory machine is simply 
too large, and too politically dominated, to be effective.225  
As the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill 
and Offshore Drilling described, from its outset “federal regulation 
of offshore drilling awkwardly combined” two competing 
priorities—environmental protection and energy independence—
which were often difficult to reconcile “as a series of Congresses, 
 
 223. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 102 (1972) (White, J., dissenting). 
 224. Similarly, some commentators have questioned the desirability of allowing states 
that prefer more stringent regulation to ratchet up their rules beyond federal minimum 
standards but at the same time prohibiting those that prefer less regulation to ratchet down 
their own. See, e.g., William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 3 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 261, 292–93 (2008) (noting that the problems created by 
overlapping regulatory systems constitute “the strongest point in favor of ceiling preemption”). 
For a thorough discussion of this debate, see William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: 
Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547 (2007). 
 225. See BP COMM’N, supra note 3, at 55–86 (describing various federal regulatory 
oversights that led to the BP explosion and oil spill). As the Commission explains, “[t]he rig’s 
demise signals the conflicted evolution—and severe shortcomings—of federal regulation of 
offshore oil drilling in the United States, and particularly of Minerals Management Service 
oversight of deepwater drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.” Id. at 55–56. 
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Presidents, and Secretaries of the Interior” moved in and out of 
power.226 The result was an odd, and often irrational, set of rules. 
“In some offshore regions,” for example, “oil drilling was essentially 
banned in response to environmental concerns. Elsewhere, most 
notably in the Gulf, some environmental protections and safety 
oversight were formally relaxed or informally diminished so as to 
render them ineffective.”227 As drilling moved further offshore and 
more money poured into federal coffers, safety and environmental 
risks increased. Unfortunately, these risks “were not matched by 
greater, more sophisticated regulatory oversight.”228 
Some problems were due to the fact that the same federal 
agency, the Minerals Management Service (MMS), was “responsible 
for regulatory oversight of offshore drilling—and for collecting 
revenue from that drilling.”229 A 2008 study by the Interior 
Department revealed numerous ethical scandals involving MMS 
employees, “including allegations of financial self-dealing, accepting 
gifts from energy companies, cocaine use and sexual misconduct.”230 
Another Interior Department report prepared after the BP spill cited 
communication problems at the Agency as well as unevenly staffed 
offices and inadequate training.231 As the National Commission put 
it: 
[T]he overall picture of MMS that has emerged since [the spill] is 
distressing. MMS became an agency systematically lacking the 
resources, technical training, or experience in petroleum 
engineering that is absolutely critical to ensuring that offshore 
 
 226. Id. at 56. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 65. 
 230. Charlie Savage, Sex, Drug Use and Graft Cited in Interior Department, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sep. 11, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/11/ 
washington/11royalty.html. 
 231. See WILMA A. LEWIS ET AL., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF SAFETY OVERSIGHT BD., 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR KEN SALAZAR (Sep. 1, 
2010), available at http://www.noia.org/website/download.asp?id=40069. The report 
revealed that MMS “[e]mployee performance plans and monetary awards . . . [were 
sometimes] based on meeting deadlines for leasing or development approvals—financial 
incentives that could distort balanced decision-making.” Id. at 20. In the Agency’s Pacific 
Region, where far less offshore drilling takes place, the ratio of inspectors to facilities was 1-to-
5, yet in the Gulf of Mexico, it was an astonishing 1-to-54. Id. at 13. Inspectors often lacked 
necessary tools, such as laptops, and many complained of a lack of support from management. 
Id. at 15. 
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drilling is being conducted in a safe and responsible manner. For a 
regulatory agency to fall so short of its essential safety mission is 
inexcusable.232 
In light of such failures, it is puzzling that critics of fracking believe 
so adamantly in the superiority of national controls over a state-
centric system that has worked with relatively few problems for six 
decades. 
C. Financial Costs of Federal Regulation 
Even if fracking regulators were somehow immune from the 
failures that have plagued other agencies, additional federal 
regulation should not be adopted without a realistic assessment of its 
price tag. Testifying before the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce in 2005, Victor Carrillo, chairman of the Texas Railroad 
Commission, argued that stricter federal fracking standards “would 
not result in cleaner water but only in adding significant cost. Such 
unnecessary regulation and the concomitant cost can only serve to 
retard the development of much needed natural gas in this 
country.”233 This statement seems even more appropriate six years 
later, as additional research has revealed just how significant those 
costs could be. 
Merely studying the issue at the federal level can be expensive. As 
part of its Science to Achieve Results Program, the EPA requested 
$4.3 million for fracking research alone in fiscal year 2011.234 The 
amount constitutes a $2.5 million increase from 2010.235 The costs 
of actually administering a federal fracking regulatory program, after 
research is completed and rules are drafted, would undoubtedly be 
astronomically higher. 
Compounding this concern is the serious potential for federal 
financial waste. According to a study completed in early 2011 by the 
Government Accountability Office, “overlapping and duplicative 
 
 232. BP COMM’N, supra note 3, at 57. 
 233. Victor Carrillo, Chairman, Tex. R.R. Comm’n Representing the Interstate Oil and 
Gas Compact Comm’n, Testimony Submitted to the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce 
(Feb. 10, 2005), http://archives.energycommerce.house.gov/reparchives/108/ 
Hearings/02102005hearing1428/Carrillo.pdf. 
 234. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FY 2011 BUDGET IN BRIEF 13–14 (Feb. 2010), 
available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Adobe/PDF/P10069PG.PDF. 
 235. Id. at 14. 
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[federal] programs . . . cost taxpayers billions of dollars each year.”236 
The nonpartisan office uncovered a staggering number of federal 
inefficiencies, including “82 federal programs to improve teacher 
quality; 80 to help disadvantaged people with transportation; 47 for 
job training and employment; and 56 to help people understand 
finances.”237 It seems unlikely that additional federal hydraulic 
fracturing regulation, if enacted, would not suffer from similar 
financial inefficiencies. 
Of course, state regulatory agencies could be just as wasteful. 
Nevertheless, citizens are arguably more equipped to hold local and 
state government officers politically accountable for their waste.238 
This is so not only because citizens generally have greater access to 
local and state leaders, but also because they can compare 
government spending in their state with that of neighboring states.239 
In contrast, selecting appropriate foreign governments for 
comparisons of federal spending seems a much more daunting task. 
Regardless of the cost to taxpayers, additional federal regulation 
would put a significant financial burden on developers. A 2009 
report prepared for the American Petroleum Institute estimates that 
national fracking legislation could increase the costs of shale plays by 
$47,333 per well and non-shale plays by $109,833 per well.240 
Perhaps even more troubling is that such “added costs raise the 
economic threshold . . . at which a play can be developed,” 
decreasing the total number of wells operators who are willing to 
drill.241 As the report explains: 
Experience suggests that a 20% reduction in the number of wells 
completed each year due to increased regulation is a valid 
 
 236. Damian Paletta, Billions in Bloat Uncovered in Beltway, WSJ.COM (March 1, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703749504576172942399165436.html?
mod&mg=com-wsj. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Glicksman & Levy, supra note 205, at 592 (“[S]tate governments are more 
directly accountable and more familiar with regional conditions . . . than the federal 
government.”). 
 239. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, 
and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1995). 
 240. IHS GLOBAL INSIGHT, MEASURING THE ECONOMIC AND ENERGY IMPACTS OF 
PROPOSALS TO REGULATE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.api.org/policy/exploration/hydraulicfracturing/upload/IHS-GI-Hydraulic-
Fracturing-Natl-impacts.pdf. 
 241. Id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:33 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1780 
assumption due to the additional time needed to file permits, push-
back of drilling schedules due to higher costs, increased chance of 
litigation, injunction or other delay tactics used by opposing groups 
and availability of fracturing monitoring services.242  
Such costs would undoubtedly be passed along to consumers, 
compounding government waste with higher prices at the pump. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The tremendous economic impact of hydraulic fracturing should 
not be understated. As the need to replace conventional sources of 
energy becomes more pressing, the United States’ dependence on 
foreign oil and the risks of offshore drilling may combine to make 
the debate about fracking and other unconventional forms of drilling 
one of the most important energy-related issues of the twenty-first 
century. 
Special interest groups insist that fracking’s impact on the 
environment is disastrous, but decades of study have revealed only 
minor concerns. In light of federal regulatory failures such as those 
that led to the BP disaster in the Gulf, leaving control of hydraulic 
fracturing with the states seems to be a far more prudent course. 
Local and regional industry realities should guide energy regulation 
in the United States, and state officials are far more equipped than 
federal employees to successfully account for the geological and 
human variables that shape onshore development. State regulation of 
such development has intensified as unconventional methods of 
drilling have increased. In the process, courts have properly 
addressed the legal aspects of hydraulic fracturing while giving 
appropriate deference to agency regulations based on state common 
law theories, legislative directives, environmental needs, and local 
practices. 
Hydraulic fracturing has played an important role in the oil and 
gas industry for more than sixty years. Regulatory intrusions by the 
federal government at this point will only create unnecessary financial 
burdens and hinder developers’ ability to efficiently extract 
hydrocarbons. 
 
 
 
 
 242. Id. 
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As the Groundwater Protection Council warned more than a 
decade ago: “If additional federal regulations were to be imposed 
they would not be based on scientific observation of associated 
contamination, and there would be little if any increase in protection 
of public health and the environment.”243 With so little to gain, the 
costs of additional federal controls are simply unjustifiable. 
Matt Willie 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 243. GROUND WATER PROT. COUNCIL, SURVEY RESULTS ON INVENTORY AND EXTENT 
OF HYDRAULIC FRACTURING IN COALBED METHANE WELLS IN THE PRODUCING STATES 10 
(1998), available at http://www.energyindepth.org/PDF/hydraulic-fracturing-inventory.pdf. 
 .  J.D. candidate, April 2012, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young 
University. I would like to thank Stefany Willie, Trent Andrews, and Professor John Fee for 
reviewing earlier drafts of this Comment and offering numerous helpful suggestions. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:33 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1782 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
